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ABSTRACT 
One of the main purposes of a Hastily Formed Network (HFN) is to provide 
immediate access to networked voice, data, and video services for as many users as 
possible. Following terrorist attacks like those in September 2001 or devastating natural 
disasters like the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in August 
2005 users of the HFN will likely include survivors; first responders; local, state, and 
federal government agencies; non-government organizations; militaries; and others. 
These varied users will have different purposes for accessing HFN services; some will 
require their information to remain private while others will not. These needs for privacy 
and openness appear to present conflicting requirements: provide unrestricted access for 
many users but ensure “privacy” or security of at least some information within the 
network.  The purpose of this thesis is three-fold: first, to explore methodologies for 
securing the HFN; second, to examine commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and 
accepted best practices that provide the necessary security; and third, to provide a limited 
implementation example and a more robust target architecture that could provide security 
on the wireless segments while maintaining open access to the HFN and minimizing 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
There have been numerous natural disasters in the last two years. Two of the 
largest were the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the two devastating 
hurricanes that hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in late August and mid-September of 2005. The 
United States provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in many 
ways to the victims of these Complex Humanitarian Disasters (CHD). A team of faculty 
and students from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) participated directly in relief of 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina victims by installing, operating, and 
maintaining Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) in Thailand and Mississippi. Each HFN 
consisted of satellite communications (SATCOM) and wireless network equipment that 
allowed disaster victims to make phone calls, send email, or use the Internet to contact 
loved ones and to file claims with the government.  The author was a member of the team 
that assisted the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The following is a short summary of the 
situation the team faced and the support provided. 1 
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore along the 
Gulf Coast of Mississippi and Louisiana as a Category 4 storm. A few days later, NPS 
sent a team of faculty and students, along with the NPS Nemesis Mobile Research 
Facility (MRF)2, to provide assistance to the Naval Oceanography Center (NAVO) at 
Stennis Space Center, MS. The intent was to use the Nemesis MRF and commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) gear to bring NAVO back online with SATCOM-based Internet access 
and provide voice, data, and video communications capabilities as soon as possible. 
Upon arriving, the NPS advance team found that NAVO no longer needed help 
and the team was tasked to assist the Hancock County, MS, Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC).  The EOC assigned the NPS team to assist in restoring communications 
                                                 
1 See Steckler, Bradford, & Urrea (2005). This is an extensive lessons learned and after action report 
about the NPS efforts supporting Hurricane Katrina victims and provides much more detail. The full text of 
this report is available at http://www.nps.navy.mil/disasterrelief/docs/NPS-Katrina_AAR_LL.pdf with 
additional information about NPS’s disaster relief programs at http://www.nps.navy.mil/disasterrelief.  
2 NPS Nemesis MRF is a 33-foot Class A Motor home converted for wireless networks research & 
operations support. 
2 
for the Hancock Medical Center (HMC), local government offices, police and fire 
stations, temporary emergency services locations, and relief shelters in the disaster 
stricken areas of Bay St. Louis and Waveland, MS. Figure 1 shows several pictures taken 
by team members of the scene that greeted the team upon arrival. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Photos of Devastated Areas in Bay St. Louis and Waveland, MS 
(From Steckler, Bradford, and Urrea, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the map of where the team installed the HFN and its relative 
location to New Orleans, LA. 
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Figure 2.   Map Showing NPS HFN Location3 
                                                 
3 Map courtesy of Google Maps. 
4 
NPS teamed with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Networks and 
Information Integration and several vendors (Cisco, Microsoft, Redline, and Mercury 
Data Systems) to create the first and only official and publicly accessible wireless 
network in an area that suffered virtually 100% disruption of all communications 
capabilities. The NPS-led team of industry and Department of Defense (DoD) entities 
successfully integrated key wireless technologies (e.g., 802.11, 802.16, SATCOM, Voice 
Over Internet Protocol [VoIP]) in the disaster zone, bringing the first Internet 
connectivity and dial-tone telephony to the entire region. First responders, many local 
hurricane survivors, relief agencies, city/county government officials, and hundreds of 
volunteers were able to communicate with the outside world for the first time as a result 
of the HFN this team set up. 
The team worked quickly to establish the HFN by installing SATCOM and 
wireless equipment using the HMC parking lot as a base of operations. They had this first 
node of the network up within 5 hours of arrival providing voice and data 
communications for myriad agencies that had set up for emergency operations in the 
HMC parking lot (including the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], the 
Federal protective Service, Florida’s Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, National Guard 
Emergency Medical and Security units, a Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, 
regional ambulance service providers, and the medical center staff). In the next few days, 
the team systematically connected other key locations (e.g., food distribution points, 
public shelters, emergency facilities, and government buildings) via 802.16 WiMAX 




Figure 3.   NPS HFN Nodes (From Steckler, Bradford, & Urrea, 2005)4 
 
                                                 
4. Image courtesy of Google Maps. 
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Figure 4 shows a more detailed diagram of the HFN. It includes the SATCOM, 
802.16 and 802.11 wireless, and management equipment. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Hurricane Katrina HFN Architecture (From Steckler et al., 2005) 
7 
The NPS-led team operated and maintained these networks until September 30, 
2006 when FEMA contracted for an outside vendor to first maintain and then replace 
NPS’ HFN equipment. The installation, operation, and maintenance of this HFN provided 
a much needed service that assisted thousands of victims, first responders, volunteers, 
and local, state, and federal government officials.  But, did these networks also allow bad 
people to take advantage of these victims? 
B. SHOULD A DISASTER RELIEF HFN BE SECURE? 
The author has no direct evidence that anyone abused or misused the network 
either in Thailand or Mississippi, but there was nothing in place to detect or prevent such 
abuse if anyone wanted to try.  NPS deployed these HFNs with no wireless security 
measures for several reasons: 1) the HFN program at NPS is still evolving; 2) there was 
no existing security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for deployment of the HFN gear; 
and 3) during implementation, the desire for maximum user support and minimum 
management complexity overrode the requirement for security.  Anyone willing to put in 
the time could take advantage of vulnerabilities within this type of network and gain 
access to any information. This begs the question: should an HFN even be protected? 
DoD Directive (DoDD) 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA), paragraph 4.2 states 
All DoD information systems shall maintain an appropriate level of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability 
that reflect a balance among the importance and sensitivity of the 
information and information assets; documented threats and 
vulnerabilities; the trustworthiness of users and interconnecting systems; 
the impact of impairment or destruction to the DoD information system; 
and cost effectiveness. 
According to paragraph 4.1 of DoDD 8100.2, Use of Commercial Wireless 
Devices, Services, and Technologies in the DoD Global Information Grid, wireless 
devices that connect to DoD networks are part of those networks and must conform to 
DoDD 8500.1 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.2, Information Assurance 
Implementation. The “catch” is the HFNs deployed in Thailand and Mississippi did not 
directly connect to any DoD networks.  Therefore, they were not subject to DoD policies 
per se; so, why bother to protect the networks?  
8 
As Dodd (2005) points out, wireless network security is a serious issue users must 
address to maintain their privacy and protect their data.  In an informal study the author 
conducted, the conclusions indicated an attacker will likely attack a wireless network, 
even if it is secured, if he/she believes there may be some profit and will absolutely attack 
an unprotected network (if for no other reason than just for fun). Refer to Chapter II for 
full details.  Therefore, if network exploitation/attack is likely or imminent, what 
information needs to be protected? 
C. WHAT INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE PROTECTED? 
The reader may ask what information needs to be protected in these scenarios 
where the focus is all about helping the victims.  In short, there are many types of 
information within an HFN that potentially need to be protected from both the casual 
observer and the potential adversary. First, the identity of victims and their private 
information should be protected to prevent identity theft (e.g., someone could monitor the 
unprotected HFN and “steal” the identity of a victim then collect the FEMA disaster 
checks). Second, first responder communications may need to be private (especially 
when talking about medical and force protection issues). Third, information about where 
relief supplies may be delivered or stock piled should be protected to prevent 
unauthorized interception or theft of supplies. In Indonesia, there were claims the 
Gerakan Acheh Merdeka rebels were hijacking relief supplies in early January, 20055. 
These rebels could easily get this type of information from an unprotected network.  
Finally, in Mississippi, after Hurricane Katrina, the NPS team used the HFN for its only 
means of data communication with higher headquarters. This means that all emails sent 
from the deployed team to Joint Task Force Katrina, NPS staff and faculty, indeed 
anyone, flowed across this unsecured HFN. 
In summary, unprotected networks are easy targets. Attackers may even attempt 
to penetrate protected networks if they think the payoff is big enough. Additionally, there 
is information within the HFN that warrants protection. Therefore, it behooves the 
information security professional to take steps to secure HFNs, even those set up for 
disaster relief. When properly secured, these networks will have the IA attributes of 
                                                 
5 CBS News online article, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/12/world/main666295.shtml, 
Retrieved January 2006 
9 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability of information 
as required by DoDD 8500.1.  The next section provides definitions of these IA terms so 
the reader understands how having these attributes is beneficial. 
D. DEFINITIONS OF IA TERMS6 
1. Confidentiality 
Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, 
processes, or devices.  
2.  Integrity  
In a formal security mode, integrity is interpreted to mean protection against 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information. 
3. Authentication 
Security measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or 
originator, or a means of verifying an individual's authorization to receive specific 
categories of information. 
4. Non-repudiation 
Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient 
is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so neither can later deny having processed 
the data. 
5. Availability 
Timely, reliable access to data and information services for authorized users.  
E. SCOPE OF WORK 
Some would argue that non-repudiation is a derived attribute7 (i.e., a mix of 
authentication and integrity) and this author will not debate that issue here. In addition, 
availability, while a highly desirable attribute of any network, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Therefore, this thesis will focus on security mechanisms that address the first three 
of these attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.  Furthermore, the 
security mechanisms investigated for this thesis apply primarily to the 802.11 wireless 
equipment within the HFN.  Some products reviewed do provide security for other 
protocols such as 802.16 and those are noted where applicable. 
 
                                                 
6 Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 4009, National IA Glossary, revised May 2003. 
7 NPS (2005) Course Notes for CS3690: Network Security, Instructor: J. D. Fulp, Section 3, slide 7 
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F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II, To Secure or Not Secure: Is That the Question? This Chapter is an 
extract of a paper the author wrote in partial fulfillment of a modeling course. It models 
the “conflict” between an information security professional and an attacker and provides 
an analysis of the potential for attack in various situations. It concludes that an 
unprotected network is virtually guaranteed to be attacked and one that has security 
mechanisms in place is likely to be attacked if the value of the information within is 
tempting enough to the attacker. 
Chapter III, Securing an HFN, presents two methods for securing an enterprise 
wireless network that can be applied to the HFN Scenario. The first method comes from a 
white paper by AirDefense and suggests a three-step approach: securing the end points, 
securing the communications channels, and monitoring for security and compliance. The 
second method, from Motorola, uses a holistic approach and recommends incorporating 
people, policy, process, and technology into the wireless security architecture. A sample 
WLAN security policy template courtesy of Planet 3 Wireless is included as Appendix A. 
Chapter IV, Review of COTS Products, provides a summary of the various COTS 
products reviewed. The products are categorized based on the first method mentioned in 
Chapter III as well as which Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) layer they most closely fit 
in. If a product is Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 validated or 
Common Criteria certified it is so noted. In addition, each product is assessed as to which 
of the IA attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and authentication it supports. The 
chapter also provides with a detailed description of each product or product category the 
author reviewed. 
Chapter V, A Secure Wireless Architecture for HFNs, begins with an example of 
an actual implementation of some of the wireless security principles introduced in 
previous chapters using some of the products listed in Chapter IV. This implementation 
focuses primarily on securing the wireless communications path. Next, this chapter 
provides a target wireless architecture that could be used to include security of end 
devices and monitoring of the network. 
11 
Chapter VI, Conclusions, provides a summary of the key findings, some 


























II. TO SECURE OR NOT TO SECURE:  
IS THAT THE QUESTION? 
The following is an extract from a paper focused on modeling the IA decision of 
whether or not to purchase security hardware and/or software or take other steps to secure 
an HFN being used in support of a Complex Humanitarian Disaster (CHD) (e.g., Indian 
Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina).8 This paper attempted to develop theoretical payoffs 
for the defender and attacker and showed a two-person zero-sum game. Based on the 
likely outcome of the game, the defender is faced not with the decision of whether or not 
to provide security, but how much security to implement. This decision is based on 
certain variables including: the value of the information needing to be protected, the 
perceived threat of attack, the vulnerabilities on the network itself, the estimated cost of 
providing safeguards on the network, and the potential return on investment. Ultimately, 
the decision maker must choose a way to minimize the risk to the information subject to 
constraints of budget, equipment, and personnel. 
A. THE MODEL: A TWO-PERSON, ZERO-SUM, NON-COOPERATIVE 
GAME 
Assume the IA professional and an adversary are players in a two-person game.  
This model will refer to the IA professional as the “Good Guy” and the adversary as the 
“Bad Guy”. They each have opposing goals with respect to information within the target 
network.  The Good Guy wants to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of 
certain (or all) information. The Bad Guy wants to gain easy access to that information in 
the hopes of exploiting it for personal gain (or maybe just for the fun of it). The Good 
Guy can secure or not secure the system and the Bad Guy can attack or not attack.  
1. Good Guy Choices 
Table 1 shows the Good Guy’s preferred outcomes from best (4) to worst (1), 
based on effort (Low, High) and possible outcomes (Success, Fail), where success means 
no information is exploited and failure means the Bad Guy got in and exploited the 
information. 
 
                                                 
8 The paper was written by the author in partial fulfillment of course requirements for SO4410: Models 
of Conflict, December 15, 2005 and is included here with slight modification.. 
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Table 1.   Good Guy Desired Outcomes 
 
Utility Definition 
4 Best Case: don’t secure, no attack (means no money, time or 
effort expended on securing the network and no attack) 
3 Next Best Choice: secure, no attack (means some amount of 
money, time and effort expended securing the network and no 
attack) 
2 Next Choice: secure, attack (means some amount of money, 
time and effort expended securing the network and 
information may be exploited) 
1 Worst Case: don’t secure, attack (means no money, time or 
effort expended on securing the network and information is 
exploited) 
 
It is difficult to assign actual utilities of these rankings due to the many variables 
involved. Therefore, this paper will assume the ordinal and cardinal utilities are equal. 
 
   
   
1        2        3        4 
Figure 5.   Good Guy Utility Scale 
 
2. Bad Guy Choices 
Table 2 shows the utilities, in order from best (4) to worst (1) for the Bad Guy 
based on the effort (Low, High) and possible outcomes (Succeed, Fail), where success 
means information is exploited and failure means the Good Guy protected the system and 
no information is exploited. One will notice these are the opposite of the views of success 





Table 2.   Bad Guy Desired Outcomes 
 
Utility Definition 
4 Best Case: attack, not secure (means the attacker had to 
expend little money, time or effort attacking the network and 
information is exploited since there was no security) 
3 Next Best Choice: attack, secure (means the attacker expends 
a lot of money, time or effort on attacking the network, but is 
able to gain access and information is exploited) 
2 Next Choice: no attack, secure (no attack = no information) 
1 Worst Case: no attack, no secure (no attack = no information 
even though it wasn’t protected) 
 
Again, it is difficult to assign actual utilities of these rankings due to the many 
variables involved. Therefore, this paper will assume the ordinal and cardinal utilities are 
equal. 
 
   
   
1        2        3        4 
Figure 6.   Bad Guy Utility Scale 
 
 
3. The Game 
Based on the desired outcomes above, a two-person game develops with a matrix 
as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Good Guy vs. Bad Guy 
 
Based on the assigned utilities, a Nash Equilibrium9 appears at (2, 3) –  Good Guy 
secure, Bad Guy attack. In fact, the Bad Guy has a dominant strategy to attack no matter 
what the Good Guy does. In reality, this is perfectly logical since the attacker can easily 
succeed if the Good Guy does not secure the network and might succeed even against a 
“secure” network.  For the Good Guy, there is no dominant strategy as depicted in the 
matrix. However, the “Not secure, don’t attack” outcome is not very likely and the “Not 
secure, attack” outcome is one the Good Guy cannot withstand.  Therefore, the likely 
outcome is the Bad Guy will attack (his dominant strategy) and the Good Guy better 
secure the network. The next section provides a framework to help determine how much 
security is necessary to minimize the potential loss. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Definition: Nash equilibrium are sets of strategies for players in a no cooperative game such that no 
single one of them would be better off switching strategies unless others did. . 
Online Economics Glossary, http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/nashequilibrium.htm, 
Retrieved August 28, 2006. 
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B. THE DECISION 
According to the Internet Storm Center the average time between attacks is 19 
minutes.10 An article on the website www.theregister.co.uk refers to a recent attack 
against the online security systems of a Christian charity in the United Kingdom.11 The 
model shown in this paper concludes an adversary’s dominant strategy is to attack no 
matter what the Good Guy does. Given these facts, one can easily conclude the Bad Guy 
will attack an HFN. Therefore, the Good Guy must determine the level of protection 
necessary to make the risk of attack “acceptable”. In modeling this, the Good Guy wants 
to minimize risk subject to constraints of budget, manpower, and equipment. One method 
of analyzing risk is shown below. 
1. Decision Variables 
With respect to information assurance, the decision maker must balance the risks 
of having information compromised or exploited with the costs of securing the network. 
One way of illustrating this is reflected in the “IA Equation” shown below:12 
Residual Risk = (Threats  Vulnerabilities  Information Value) - Safeguards× ×  
The product of threats X vulnerabilities X information value represents the risk to the 
network. The IA practitioner’s job is to get the residual risk to an acceptable level. The 
definition of “acceptable” will be dependent on the situation. One method for performing 
this calculation is to assign a dollar value to each of these variables.  Then, the decision 
point occurs when the residual risk level is equal to or below the amount the decision 
maker is willing to pay. However, assigning dollar amounts to these variables is non-
trivial and beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will explain each of the variables 
and address the relative relationships among them. 
a. Threats (Will Someone Want to Attack and Why?) 
This is the least controllable variable in the equation. Threats can be 
categorized in various ways. One method is to classify them based on the attribute of IA 
that is being attacked: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or availability. A second 
                                                 
10  SANS Internet Storm Center, http://isc.sans.org/ Last accessed December 10, 2005. 
11 The Register Web Site, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/12/charity_hack/, Last accessed 
November 20, 2005. 
12 NPS (2005) Course Notes for CS3690: Network Security, Instructor: J. D. Fulp, Section 3, slide 8  
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method provides categories such as human error, abuse of authority, direct probing, 
probing with malicious software, direct penetration, or subversion of security mechanism. 
These various threats are perpetrated by two main types of attackers (professionals and 
amateurs) who can perform their attacks from inside or outside your network. For an 
extensive discussion of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) threats and vulnerabilities 
as well as basic WLAN security principles see Kessel and Goodwin (2005).13 
As the previous modeling points out, there is a high likelihood of some 
sort of attack. In the context of HFN for CHD, the type of attack is difficult to classify. 
The various types of attacks mentioned each present a different level of severity (or 
potential damage) and each have a different probability of happening. This probability is 
dependent on the situation and requires further study. 
b. Vulnerabilities (What are the Known Weaknesses?) 
Vulnerabilities represent the attributes of a system’s design that result in 
the potential for intentional or accidental problems.14 Once identified, there are well 
known ways to reduce various vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities of the HFN in the 
context of a CHD have not been extensively studied and require further research.  
c. Information Value (What are We Protecting?) 
Information in the context of a CHD has different value to different users. 
As previously mentioned, there is information within the network that should only be 
visible to certain individuals. Exactly what information is this? How does one determine 
the value of this information? The answers to these questions are dependent on the exact 
situation. The information owner must determine the value and whether or not the 
information should be protected.  
d. Costs of Safeguards (Hardware, Software, Time) 
Safeguards are the countermeasures applied to a system “after the fact” 
that attempt to mitigate the risk (threat X vulnerabilities X information value). Protecting 
a network’s information from unauthorized access and unwanted tampering can be done 
in many ways.  These methods can be relatively inexpensive or very expensive and may 
involve hardware, software, and additional personnel. How much of each to use will be 
                                                 
13 Kessel and Goodwin, (2005), Chapters II & III. 
14 NPS (2005) Course Notes for CS3690: Network Security, Instructor: J. D. Fulp, Section 3, slide 10 
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constrained by the budget. The IA professional must factor in the costs associated with 
each chosen security measure and weigh this as a decision variable. One method for 
performing this analysis is looking at the return on investment (ROI) of each proposed 
solution as indicated in the equation below.  
($Expected loss without safeguard - $Expected loss with safeguard - $Cost of safeguard)
ROI = 
$Expected loss without safeguard
 
This will yield an ROI value between 0 and 1. The closer a solution is to 1, 
the better it is. The IA professional can then compute the ROI for each security measure. 
2. Putting It All Together 
The IA professional now has a methodology to follow to determine which threats 
to protect against, vulnerabilities to close, value of the information to be protected, and 
the cost of implementing various security measures.  While this may sound simple, it 
requires significant work to “crunch the numbers” and is highly dependent on the specific 
implementation of the network being secured. The key is to get the optimal level of 
security at the minimal cost. Motorola (2006, p. 4) states “an effective risk-management 
approach to security balances the costs of security measures against the potential costs of 
the breaches they are designed to prevent.” Figure 8 illustrates this tradeoff. 
 
Figure 8.   Optimal Security and Cost (From Motorola, 2006). 
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C. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MODELING 
1.  This Model 
Each disaster is unique and will present its own set of challenges. Deploying an 
HFN to support the disaster will have to be flexible to meet those challenges. However, 
providing an HFN with no security will only complicate the already hectic situation for 
those it is intended to help.  
Based on the modeling done in this case study, it is advisable for the security 
professional to provide at least some security apparatus to the HFN. When considering 
which security measures to employ, one must consider the risks (threats, vulnerabilities, 
and information value) and the costs (hardware, software, and personnel) to determine 
how much security to implement. One technique is to compare the expected cost of the 
attack with the expected cost of the security as shown in the ROI equation above.  
One must use caution, however, when implementing the various security 
measures to ensure all user access requirements can still be met. There are security 
measures available that will allow for the protection of information without blocking 
access to those users, like the recent victims of Hurricane Katrina, desperately needing 
unhindered access to the Internet. See Chapter V for details of a possible solution for this 
type of scenario. 
2. Applicability to Other Scenarios 
This modeling should be general enough to apply not only to HFNs, but also to 
other situations where the IA professional must decide how much security to implement 
on a particular network.  
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III. SECURING AN HFN 
As the previous chapters have shown, an HFN should have at least some measure 
of security implemented.  The amount of wireless security required may be situation and 
resource dependent, but there are some constants that can be designed into the HFN 
architecture. 
Many experts agree the best defense is one of layers or “Defense in Depth.” Like 
an enterprise WLAN, an HFN must consider wireless security from the edges of the 
network (e.g., the client devices) to the wired portions of the network (e.g., the servers, 
whether local or remote).  The following sections present two approaches to providing 
wireless security within an HFN using this layered approach. While some specific 
vendors and products may be mentioned, this chapter will be limited to non-technical, 
general steps for security. 
A. AIRDEFENSE THREE STEP METHOD 
In an AirDefense white paper titled Three Steps for Bullet-proof Wireless LAN 
Security & Management, the authors suggest a layered approach to security that will 
address all network components. They recommend 1) securing WLAN devices, 2) 
securing communications, and 3) monitoring for security and compliance.15  Each of the 
three steps will be explored in more depth below. All three of these should be addressed 
in a well-written wireless security policy for the HFN. See Appendix A for a sample 
policy.  
1. Securing WLAN Devices 
There are two categories of WLAN devices typically deployed in an HFN to 
support disasters like those discussed in Chapter I. First, there were a limited number of 
WLAN devices provided by NPS (e.g., Wireless Access Points [WAP], laptops and VoIP 
phones).  It is these devices that must be secured to ensure this level of wireless 
protection is properly implemented. There are a number of ways to secure these devices 
including:  
• Windows update: ensure all patches and updates are applied to your operating system 
and major applications 
                                                 
15 AirDefense (2006), p. 1. For more information on their products, see Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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• Use National Security Agency Security Configuration Guides16 to secure the 
operating system, applications, and wireless features 
• Use Defense Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implementation 
Guides17 and checklists 
• Ensure only guest access to laptops with no administrator privileges 
• Antivirus update: ensure the latest virus signatures and antivirus software are installed 
on applicable devices 
• Firmware update: ensure latest firmware and operating system software are installed 
on WAPs and VoIP phones. 
• Personal firewall (AirDefense recommends AirDefense Personal for this task18) 
The second category of WLAN devices in use in an HFN are those provided by 
anyone else (e.g., First responders, local government agencies, survivors).  While there 
should be provisions for these users to connect their own equipment (e.g., Guest access 
which will be discussed later), these devices must be treated as untrusted. Procedurally, it 
would be counter productive for the HFN administrators to have to verify configurations 
on every end-user device that would connect. Therefore, to enable the most users to join 
the network, these devices should only be allowed to access the untrusted path (see 
Chapter V for an implementation using Virtual LANs [VLAN] to segment trusted and 
untrusted traffic).  
2. Securing Communications 
This step focuses on the authentication of user devices with the network and 
encryption of the data flowing across the airwaves. There are many forms of 
authentication including Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and all its variants. 
The reader is referred to the plethora of readily available literature for technical details on 
these various protocols. The authentication step is one of the most important in 
establishing a secure WLAN. It is here that the wireless client device is authenticated as 
being allowed to join the network. There is, however, another equally important aspect 
that is often overlooked: authentication of the network to the client device.  
                                                 
16 National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/snac/, Last accessed August 27, 2006. 
17 Defense Information Systems Agency, http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/stig/, Last accessed August 27, 
2006. 
18 AirDefense (2006), p. 2. AirDefense Personal protects mobile users of hotspots and other public 
Wi-Fi networks from wireless-specific risks that could expose private data and transactions. 
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Having the authentication done in both directions is called mutual authentication 
and is the best case for a truly secure authentication scheme. Edney and Arbaugh (2004) 
assert,  
In the wireless world, you usually need mutual authentication. The 
network wants proof about the user, but the user also wants proof that the 
network really is the expected one. This is important for Wi-Fi LANs 
because it is so inexpensive to set up decoy access points.19 
They go on to say that authentication must be performed initially when a client 
joins the network, but should also be done every time the client communicates with the 
network. Once the mutual authentication has taken place, the next step is to set up the 
encrypted communications channel to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the 
information flowing across the airwaves. 
For wireless path encryption, IEEE 802.11 provides three cryptographic 
algorithms to protect data traffic: Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP), and Counter Mode with Cipher-Block Chaining with Message 
Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) using the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES).20 The reader is again referred the available literature for technical details. IEEE 
802.11i (Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements), 
ratified July 29, 2004, provides for more robust security mechanisms. In the book WiFoo: 
The Secrets of Wireless Hacking, the authors argue the improved data confidentiality and 
integrity may improve wireless security for those choosing to implement the new 
standard and may force attackers to search for pre-802.11i networks.21  Due to the known 
problems with WEP, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which uses TKIP, and WPA2, 
which uses TKIP or CCMP, are now the wireless security protocols of choice. According 
to the Wi-Fi Alliance, there are at least 1488 devices that are WPA certified and over 575 
devices available that are WPA2 certified.22 
In the absence of one of the algorithms above, a wireless user could instead use a 
trusted “wired” security solution, Virtual Private Networks (VPN), to provide the 
                                                 
19 Edney & Arbaugh, (2004), p. 91. 
20 IEEE 802.11i, (2004), p. 12. 
21 Vladimirov, Gavrilenko, & Mikhailovsky (2004), p. 251. 
22 Wi-Fi Alliance, http://certifications.wi-fi.org/wbcs_certified_products.php, Last accessed August 5, 
2006. 
24 
confidentiality needed. In a white paper from Blue Ridge Networks titled Wireless 
Security is Broken and it Doesn’t Matter, the authors maintain that VPN technology has 
stood the test of time and can be a viable solution to protect both wireless and wired 
communications regardless of whether or not other encryption mechanisms are used on 
the WLAN link.23 While this solution is indeed proven, it does come at a price. Most 
VPN implementations require both server and client-side application software which 
increases the management overhead. Furthermore, the type of VPN implementation must 
be considered. Korelc and Tittel (2006) say the two most popular VPN implementations, 
IPSec (IP Security) and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), each have their own strengths and 
weaknesses. This is another factor that administrators must consider when designing the 
security mechanisms for their WLAN links.  
3. Monitoring for Security and Compliance 
Once the end-user devices and communications paths have been protected, the 
WLAN must be monitored for security and compliance with policies. To do this 
effectively requires round-the-clock monitoring of the airwaves to detect intruders and 
ensure that authorized users remain properly configured and authenticated while 
connected. AirDefense advocates a monitoring solution that provides the following:24 
• Ears and Eyes of the airspace 
• Rogue Detection & Mitigation 
• Intrusion Detection 
• Active Defenses 
• Policy Enforcement 
• Forensic & Incident Analysis 
• Fault Diagnostics & Health Monitoring 
They recommend their AirDefense Enterprise solution to handle these varied 
tasks. Other vendors provide similar products (see Chapter IV for details).  
 
                                                 
23 Blue Ridge Networks (2005), p. 3. 
24 AirDefense (2006), p. 4. 
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B. MOTOROLA’S HOLISTIC SECURITY APPROACH 
Like AirDefense, Motorola recommends a layered or holistic approach to wireless 
security. They reason that people, process, policy, and technology must all be addressed 
to have truly comprehensive wireless security.25 These four aspects of holistic security 
are further detailed below. 
1. People 
The authors of Motorola (2006) state “Once a company can leverage its most 
valuable resource, people, the ability to mitigate risks becomes more efficient and less 
cost-intensive.”26 Bruce Schneier, in his book titled Secrets and Lies, argues the fact that 
people have to use the computer introduces “the biggest security risk of them all.”27  
Schneier goes on to suggest that “people often represent the weakest link in the security 
chain and are chronically responsible for the failure of security systems.”28 Having an 
employee training and awareness program and implementing a good audit program are 
just part of the key to closing this weak link. 
Applying this aspect of security to HFNs, however, is somewhat difficult since 
you never know ahead of time who the people using the network are going to be. 
Furthermore, during disasters such as those discussed in Chapter I, there is little time and 
no mechanism for formal or informal training of users. Some of this difficulty can be 
mitigated with proper security policies such as Acceptable Use Statements (see the 
WLAN Security Policy in Appendix A for further detail). The remaining pieces of 
securing the HFN through addressing people issues are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2. Process 
Motorola (2006) claims processes that are measurable can streamline operational 
costs and enhance security thereby helping to ensure system availability, confidentiality, 
and integrity.29 In an HFN implementation, the processes for installing, operating, and 
maintaining the wireless network should be defined ahead of time. A detailed CONOPS  
 
                                                 
25 Motorola (2006). p. 9. 
26 Ibíd. 
27 Schneier (2000), p. 255. 
28 Ibíd. 
29 Motorola (2006), p. 9. 
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and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) documents would go a long way toward 
making this a reality for future HFN deployments. This is included in Chapter VI as 
future work recommended for others. 
3. Policy 
Wireless LAN security policies are a key to ensuring your network is protected. 
Moerschel, Dreger, and Carpenter (2006) state, 
When strictly followed and combined with effective technical solutions, 
wireless LAN security policies can reduce intrusions, risks, and costs 
associated with intrusion response and legal action. Where security 
policies are not strictly followed, gaping security holes exist that no 
technical solution can repair.30 
The authors of Motorola (2006) suggest that policy goes further than just risk reduction. 
They state “a prudent and dynamic policy is critical to informed decision-making.”31  
The contents of the wireless security policy are dependent on the environment in 
which the wireless LAN is deployed as well as the importance of the information flowing 
across the airwaves. Moerschel et al. (2006) provide great detail on what should go into a 
WLAN security policy.32 Planet 3 Wireless, creators of the Certified Wireless Network 
Professional program, teamed with Cisco Systems to create a WLAN Security Policy 
Template. A copy of this template has been included as Appendix A.33  
In the context of an HFN, the environment is likely to be unpredictable. There 
will be many unknowns to deal with, but having a well-written, thorough WLAN security 
policy will help deal with those uncertainties. This is an area that could benefit from 
further research and is included in Chapter VI as future work recommended for others.  
4. Technology 
Technology is the primary focus of this thesis. The authors of Motorola (2006) 
argue 
                                                 
30 Moerschel et al. (2006), p. 134. 
31 Motorola (2006), p. 9. 
32 Moerschel et al. (2006), Ch 6-9 provide detailed explanations of what should go into the policy. 
33 Also available at Planet 3 Wireless’ Certified Wireless Network Professionals (CWNP) web site, 
https://www.cwnp.com/templates/WLAN_Security_Policy_Template_v1.05.pdf To download a copy of 
the template, a user account is required (no purchase necessary). Go to www.cwnp.com for details. 
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The technology component of an effective enterprise security strategy 
encompasses traditional security measures, such as firewalls, 
authentication and [Intrusion Detection] systems. It must also account for 
ever-changing vulnerabilities, the interconnectedness of wired and 
wireless systems, and the need to identify and address emerging threats 
before they cause damage.34 
The commercial marketplace is full of products that offer various mechanisms for 
providing wireless LAN security. Chapter IV provides a summary of these various 
products and which of the IA attributes (confidentiality, integrity, and authentication) 
they provide. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the specific approach one takes, wireless security is necessary and 
achievable within an HFN. Chapter V shows a simple implementation of some of these 
security measures that the author tested in a laboratory environment and installed in the 
NPS Nemesis MRF. In addition, there is a target architecture that incorporates a layered 
approach to wireless security with additional measures that would make future HFN 
deployments even more secure.  
Providing a guest access Service Set Identifier (SSID) is also paramount in 
situations like the HA/DR scenarios discussed in Chapter I to ensure the maximum 
number of affected personnel, rescue workers, first responders, volunteers, local 
government agency personnel, and others have access to the WLAN. 
The next chapter looks at COTS products that claim to provide security for 
WLANs. Some of the products are unique to WLANs (e.g., Wireless Intrusion Detection 
Systems [WIDS], Wireless Intrusion Prevention Systems [WIPS], and WAPs).  Others 
are tried and true solutions (e.g., VLANs, VPNs, Remote Authentication Dial-In User 
Service [RADIUS]) for wired security problems that can be extended to the wireless 
domain. 
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IV. REVIEW OF COTS PRODUCTS 
A. METHODOLOGY FOR CLASSIFYING PRODUCTS 
The previous chapter discussed various strategies for applying layers of security 
or Defense in Depth for a WLAN. A robust security implementation should provide 
multiple layers of defense using products from the various layers. The products listed in 
this chapter represent only a small subset of those available on the market today. As this 
thesis research progressed, additional products were being announced on a regular 
basis.35 The products are grouped according to the method described below and are listed 
in alphabetical order within each section. 
1. AirDefense Three-Step Model 
As discussed in the previous chapter, AirDefense (2006) recommends a three-step 
approach to WLAN security: securing WLAN devices, securing communications, and 
monitoring for security and compliance on the network. This method also provides a 
convenient way to categorize the various wireless security products to better understand 
where and how they provide security.  
2. OSI Model 
Moerschel et al. (2006) claim an OSI-based model is also useful to categorize the 
various products.36 Knowing where the various products fit in the OSI model helps one 
understand how the security is implemented. Figure 9 provides a depiction of the OSI 
model. Most of the WLAN security products on the market that provide encryption do so 





                                                 
35 A list of references, including web sites, is provided As Appendix B. Additional information on 
specific products can be found by visiting the vendor’s web site. Further information on products meeting 
FIPS 140-2 validation can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401vend.htm and information on 
products meeting common criteria certification can be found by visiting 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/consumer/index.php. 











                                                 
37 OSI Model Picture, http://computing-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/OSI+model, Last accessed 
August 27, 2006. 
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Table 3 provides examples of various security solutions and where they fit in this 
model. 
 
Table 3.   Example Security Solutions by OSI Layer (From CWSP Study Guide)38 
 
Layer 2 (Data-Link Layer) 
 
• WEP (and all variations such as TKIP) 
• 802.1x/EAP (and all variations) 
• Enterprise Encryption Gateways 
• Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) 
Layer 3 (Network Layer) 
 
• Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) 
• IP Security (IPSec) 
Layer 7 (Applications Layer) 
 
• Secure Shell (SSH) 
• Secure Shell Version 2 (SSH2) 
• Novell Directory Services (NDS or eDirectory) 
• Microsoft Active Directory (AD) 
 
The following sections provide a summary table and details of the various COTS 
products the author reviewed. The table includes vendor, product, type, step, FIPS 
Validation level, Common Criteria certification level, OSI layer, and which of the IA 
attributes listed in Chapter I they provide. Following the table is a detailed listing of these 
COTS products. They are organized according to which of the three steps mentioned in 
the AirDefense (2006) white paper the product best fits. In addition, the OSI layer into 
which they most closely fall is noted. The author focused primarily on products that 
specifically provide wireless security in the context of HFNs. Some of the products, 
however, originated to fulfill a need in the “wired” environment and are included in this 
analysis because they do provide at least one of the desired security capabilities necessary 
                                                 
38 Moerschel et al. (2006), p 212. 
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in a WLAN. Some products classes such as VPN software were not individually 
reviewed, but are noted generically in the appropriate category.  
B. PRODUCT SUMMARY 
As previously mentioned, an IA professional should strive to provide Defense in 
Depth. In doing so, one must draw products from several of the categories described 
above. Table 4 shows a summary of the various products reviewed and includes the step 
(corresponding to AirDefense (2006) step 1, 2, or 3), FIPS 140-239 and Common 
Criteria40 level if applicable, OSI layer, and which of the IA attributes each product 
meets. The products appear in the table in alphabetical order by vendor. The order of 
appearance does not imply that any particular product is better than any other. 
Key to table: 
Type:   HW = Hardware; SW = Software 
Step:   1. Securing WLAN Devices;  
2. Securing Communications;  
      3. Monitoring for Security & Compliance 
FIPS 140-2:  FIPS validated at indicated level (1-4); N = not FIPS validated 
CC:  Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) level (1-7) 
  N = not certified 
Attributes:  C = Confidentiality 
I = Integrity 
A = Authentication 
3 indicates product has that attribute. 
X indicates product does not have that attribute. 
N/A = not applicable for any column in the table. 
                                                 
39 The reader is reminded that FIPS 140-2 is a validation for cryptographic modules and is therefore 
not applicable to some of the products in the table. See http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401vend.htm 
for additional information on products that have received FIPS 140-2 validation. 
40 Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels (1-7) provide a uniformly increasing scale which 
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. 
Additional information is available at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/ccintroduction.pdf,  
Retrieved September 6, 2006. See http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/consumer/index.php for a 
search capability to access certification reports. Last accessed September 1, 2006. 
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3e 527 Mesh WAP HW+SW 1, 2 2 N 3 3 3 3
3e AirGuard 110 
WLAN PC Card w/ 
Crypto Client SW 
HW+SW 1, 2 1 N 3 3 3 3
AirDefense Personal (Firewall) SW 1 N/A N N/A X X X
AirDefense Enterprise WIPS 
(Guard, version 3.5) 
HW+SW 3 N/A 2 N/A X X X
AirMagnet SmartEdge Sensors 
AM-5010 & 5012 
HW+SW 3 2 N N/A X X X
Aruba Access Points HW+SW 1, 2 N N 3 3 3 3





HW+SW  2 N 3 3 3 3
BlueSocket BlueSecure 2100 & 
5000 Controllers 
HW+SW 3 2 N 3 3 3 3
CipherOptics Data Protection 
Gateway SG1002 
HW+SW 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Cisco WAPs HW+SW 2 2 N 3 3 3 3
Cisco Network Admission 
Control (NAC) 
HW+SW 3 N/A N N/A X X 3
Cisco WLAN Controllers  HW+SW 3 2 N 3 3 3 3
Cranite  
Systems 
Wireless Wall & 
Access Controller 
SW 2, 3 1 N 2 3 3 3
Fortress 
Technologies 
AF2100 & AF7500 
Secure Gateways 
HW+SW 2 2 N 2 3 3 3
Fortress 
Technologies 
MaPS SW 3 N/A N N/A X X 3
Fortress 
Technologies 




Client w/ Security 
Component, ver 1.2 




Server; Steel Belted 
RADIUS Server 





HW+SW 2, 3 N/A N 2 3 3 3
Newbury 
Networks 
WiFi Watchdog HW+SW 1, 3 N N N/A X X 3
Phoenix 
Technologies 
TrustConnector 2 SW 1 N N N/A X X 3
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C. PRODUCTS FOR SECURING WLAN DEVICES (STEP ONE) 
This category of products includes the WLAN devices themselves as well as 
products that help to “lock down” the WLAN devices. When purchasing WLAN devices 
(e.g., WAPs, laptops, and handheld computers/PDAs) one must ensure the product has 
built in features to prevent unauthorized access both remotely and locally.  
The COTS products in this category are, for the most part, not unique to the 
wireless domain (WAPs are discussed in Section D later in this chapter as products that 
secure the communications links). Therefore, only a high level of information is 
provided. Section E below provides another group of products that ensure the WLAN 
devices are “secure” before being allowed to join the network. 
1. Personal Firewalls 
Personal firewalls are necessary for wireless devices as well as desktop 
computers. Many vendors offer personal firewall software including McAfee, Norton, 
Microsoft, and AirDefense. The authors of AirDefense (2006) contend the protection 
they offer is a must to ensure the WLAN edge devices on your network are properly 
protected. 
According to www.airdefense.net, AirDefense Personal™, a Windows-based 
software agent, is the industry’s most advanced, wireless end-point security and policy 
enforcement solution for mobile workers. Residing on mobile users’ computers, 
AirDefense Personal quietly monitors for malicious or accidental wireless activities and 
wireless misconfigurations that may cause security exposures or policy violations.41 
2. Anti-Virus 
Anti-virus software is another “must have” to ensure the overall protection of 
wireless client devices. There are many vendors providing software in this category 
including McAfee, Symantec, Panda Software, Trend Micro, and Computer Associates to 
name a few. 
3. Disk Encryption 
Physical security of WLAN devices, especially in an environment like those 
described in Chapter I may not be a high concern. There is likely to be little or no data on 
                                                 
41 This solution complements personal firewalls and host-based IDS systems that don’t protect the 
client against wireless attacks. See AirDefense’s web site for additional information on this product at 
http://www.airdefense.net/products/adpersonal/index.php, Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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the computer that is sensitive enough to worry about. In the case where there is sensitive 
data, however, one needs to have a mechanism for protecting that information. Disk 
encryption software is one method to ensure the data is not compromised even if the 
WLAN device is. Various open source (e.g., www.truecrypt.org) and commercial 
products (e.g., PGP, Dekart) are available to provide partial or whole disk encryption.  
4. WLAN Endpoint Protection 
Phoenix Technologies provides a software product called TrustConnector 2 that is 
a cryptographically-based solution for existing Windows machines. Once loaded, it 
ensures any x86-based device connecting to an IP network is absolutely trusted by using 
an industry-unique combination of user/device authentication.42 
D. PRODUCTS FOR SECURING COMMUNICATIONS (STEP TWO) 
The products in this category provide security of the communications link 
between wireless clients and WAPs or between WAPs themselves (bridge links). This 
involves both authentication and encryption. Authentication is provided using an 
implementation of the authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) protocol. The 
most common methods for encryption are provided at either Layer 2 (e.g., encryption 
gateways) or Layer 3 (e.g., VPNs) of the OSI model. This section is divided into products 
that provide for authentication and products that provide for encryption of the link. 
1. Authentication 
This class of products is a carryover from wired networks. RADIUS is an 
implementation of the AAA protocol and is a common authentication protocol used in IP 
networks. It typically provides for authentication of clients on the network using some 
form of EAP and is of equal utility on wireless LANs. As of this writing, there are at least 
nine implementations of EAP.43 
                                                 
42 Phoenix Technologies, 
http://www.phoenix.com/en/Products/Trusted+Applications/TrustConnector/default.htm, Last accessed 
August 30, 2006. 
43 For additional information on authentication and the various implementations of EAP, see the white 
paper entitled Demystifying Wireless Network Access and 802.1X Security by Fluke Networks available at 
http://www.flukenetworks.com/FNet/en-us/findit?Document=2647086, Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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There both open source and commercial sources for RADIUS server and client 
software and appliances.44 One product was found to be FIPS 140-2 validated and is 
discussed below.  
In addition to client and server software, many vendors have RADIUS 
authentication capabilities built into their WAPs (e.g., 3Com, Cisco, Intel, and Linksys). 
Some of these WAPs use IEEE 802.1X implementations while others offer proprietary 
solutions. Therefore, one must choose carefully when engineering a solution using WAPs 
that offer authentication. 
a. Juniper Networks (formerly Funk Software) 
Juniper Networks offers RADIUS servers called Odyssey Access Server 
(OAS) and Steel Belted RADIUS (SBR) to handle remote authentication and the Odyssey 
Access Client (OAC) for WLAN devices to securely connect to the network.45 One 
version of the OAC using Juniper’s Odyssey Security Component includes a 
cryptographic module that is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validated.46 In addition, they offer an 
SBR appliance that is rack mountable and supports the Enterprise and Global Editions of 
their SBR server software. The servers, in all forms, also provide security policy 
management functions which fits under Section E of this chapter.  
2. Encryption 
In a white paper by Northrop Grumman (Knuth, 2004), the author argues that 
network security is most appropriate when implemented at the lowest layer possible and 
OSI Layer 2 solutions are superior for mobile WLAN encryption since more information 
is protected.47 Figure 10 illustrates Knuth’s point. The portion of the data not include in 
the protected payload is the only data at risk if the transmission is intercepted by an 
unauthorized recipient. 
The remainder of Section D will look at products that offer encryption at either 
Layer 2 or Layer 3 of the OSI model. This includes encryption gateways, WAPs, and 
                                                 
44 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_RADIUS_Servers, Last accessed August 27, 2006..  
45 Juniper Networks, http://www.juniper.net/solutions/literature/white_papers/200171.pdf, Last 
accessed August 29, 2006. 
46 Juniper Networks, http://www.juniper.net/products/aaa/odyssey/oac_fe.html, Last accessed August 
29, 2006. 
47 Knuth (2004), p. 5. 
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wireless client products. While there are thousands of products fitting this category, the 
following discussion focuses on those that are either FIPS 140-2 validated or have very 
specific applicability to HFNs. 
 
Figure 10.   Comparison of Security (From Knuth, 2004, p. 1.) 
 
VPN servers and software are another of the carry over technologies from the 
wired network environment.48 They are typically implemented at Layer 3 of the OSI 
model and are quite useful for securing the communications paths in wireless 
implementations as well. Blue Ridge Networks offers a line of Border Guard Security 
Appliances and Client Software that provide security for both wired and wireless 
clients.49 VPN products will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
                                                 
48 Some would argue that VPNs are all that are needed to properly secure a wireless link. For further 
information supporting this argument, see Blue Ridge Networks (2005). 
49 Blue Ridge Networks, http://www.blueridgenetworks.com/solutions/solutions_wireless.htm, Last 
accessed September 2, 2006. 
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a. Encryption Gateways 
Most encryption gateways secure information at Layer 2 of the OSI 
model. This method leaves only the link header in the clear and provides better 
confidentiality of data. Some, however, provide encryption at Layer 3.  
CipherOptics 
CipherOptics data protection gateways provide full duplex, wire-speed 
AES or 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard) IPSec encryption (100 Mbps and 
Gigabit) to broadband wireless paths as shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Secure Broadband Wireless (From CipherOptics Solution Note, 2005)50 
 
The CipherOptics solution, which operates at OSI Layer 3, creates an 
IPSec tunnel, much like a VPN, to protect the wireless point to point link as shown above 
independent of the wireless implementation (e.g., 802.11 or 802.16). In addition, 
CipherOptics data protection gateways are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated and provide the 
authentication and encryption as specified in DoDI 8100.2.51 The CipherOptics SG1002 
                                                 
50 CipherOptics Solution Note (2005), p. 2., http://www.cipheroptics.com/pdf/sn-wireless.pdf, Last 
accessed August 26, 2006. 
51 Ibid., p. 1.  
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is Common Criteria EAL2 Certified and winner of the Info Security Products Guide’s 
Product Excellence Award 2006 for Excellence in Wireless Security.52 
Fortress Technologies 
Fortress Technologies offers end-to-end security for wireless networks. 
Figure 12 shows a typical implementation using the AF7500 Security Gateway, AF 
Secure Client software, and the Management and Policy Server (MaPS). 
 
 
Figure 12.   Fortress Security System (From www.fortresstech.com) 
 
This implementation ensures that each device is authenticated before 
being allowed to access the network and all communications from end user devices (e.g., 
laptop, PDA, barcode scanner) is encrypted before passing over the wireless airwaves. 
This solution provides OSI Layer 2 protection and is FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated. It 
provides security across multiple access points simultaneously and optimizes critical 
security operations (e.g., encryption, authentication, key exchange) to minimize 
management. 
Furthermore, the Fortress Technologies family of products is protocol and 
vendor independent allowing for protection of multiple wireless technologies (e.g., 
802.11, 802.16, SATCOM, and Free Space Optical) as shown in Figure 13. 
                                                 
52 InfoSecurity Products Guide, http://www.infosecurityproductsguide.com/wireless/SG1002.html, 
Last accessed August 26, 2006. 
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Figure 13.   Fortress Secured Point-to-Point Technology  
(From http://www.fortresstech.com/solutions_applications/pdfs/federal.pdf) 
 
Finally, Fortress’ MaPS provides a centralized management and 
administration platform for security services and policy management. This product is 
discussed further in Section E later in this chapter. 
Cranite Systems 
Cranite Systems has two product lines that support securing the 
communications between WLAN devices and the network and also provide some 
management functionality.53  Cranite’s WirelessWall® solution provides an OSI Layer 2 
encryption path using FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validated technology inside the enterprise 
WLAN. It protects sensitive payload and IP address information from any unauthorized 
listeners. It is comprised of three components: the manager, access controller, and client 
as shown in Figure 14 and supports VLAN tagging, directory caching, and third party 
RADIUS servers. 
                                                 
53 See Cranite Web Site, http://www.cranite.com/ for details on both product lines. Last accessed 
August 26, 2006. 
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Figure 14.   Cranite WirelessWall® Architecture (From www.cranite.com) 
 
Cranite’s other software-based solution, SafeConnect® is specifically 
designed to provide mobile users secure connectivity to the enterprise from hotspots, 
homes, and other remote locations. It again uses an OSI Layer 2 solution along with a 
unique, patent-pending protective layer designed to abstract users from attack.54 This 
solution also has three components: client, access controller, and management system. 
While it may sound like a VPN solution, Cranite’s SafeConnect® goes beyond either 
IPSec or SSL VPN implementations by providing client-side integrity and attack 
protection from untrusted locations regardless of wireless transport (e.g., 802.11, 802.16). 
 
  
                                                 
54 See Cranite web site, http://www.cranite.com/safeconnect/safeconnect-datasheet.pdf  or 
www.cranite.com for details. Last accessed August 28, 2006. source 
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b. Wireless Access Points (WAP) 
When deploying WAPs and bridges for an HFN, there are several key 
features that must be included: encryption, authentication, and ease of management. 
There are currently at least 1,053 WAPs that carry Wi-Fi certified product status issued 
by the Wi-Fi Alliance.55 Many of these WAPs provide the three desired features. In 
addition, some enterprise class WAPs support multiple SSIDs and VLANs which enable 
traffic segmentation and further enhance security (e.g., Cisco 1200 series). This section 
presents details on three vendors who provide the desired security features listed above. 
3e Technologies International (3eTI) 
3eTI provides WLAN products including security and management server, 
mesh networking, supplicant and WLAN client devices.  3eTI’s AirGuard™ 
infrastructure solutions are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated and DoD-proven for security 
and use in the most hostile and adverse environments.56  Their offerings include indoor, 
outdoor, and video surveillance equipment (see Figure 15) and provide for encryption, 
authentication, and remote management. 
 
Figure 15.   3eTI AirGuard™ Access Points 
 
                                                 
55 Wi-Fi Alliance, http://certifications.wi-fi.org/wbcs_certified_products.php, Last accessed August 
26, 2006. 
56 3e Technologies, http://www.3eti.com/, Last accessed August 28, 2006. 
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Aruba Networks 
Aruba provides a line of products that include an operating system (OS), 
mobility controllers, and controlled access points. The OS and mobility controllers will 
be discussed in Section E of this chapter. The Aruba controlled access point line includes 
both indoor and outdoor rated WAPs that provide for encryption, authentication, and easy 
management (using ArubaOS and Aruba Mobility Controllers). The WAPs (see Figure 
16) are available with single (802.11a or b/g configurable) or dual radio (802.11a + b/g 
simultaneous) and some can act as both an access point and RF monitor concurrently.57  
 
 






                                                 
57 See Aruba Networks, http://www.arubanetworks.com/products/ for additional information. Last 
accessed August 29, 2006. 
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Cisco Systems 
Cisco Systems Unified Wireless Network offers secure, scalable, cost-
effective WLAN solutions.58 The product line includes client devices, access points, 
network infrastructure, network management, and delivery of mobility services to 
maintain network security and simplify network management. Figure 17 shows their line 
of access points and bridges. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Cisco Aironet Access Points 
 
Cisco’s Unified Wireless LAN Controllers and numerous Access Points 
are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated.59 Many of these WAPs allow for the configuration of 
multiple SSIDs and VLANs, within a single WAP, allowing for segmentation of traffic to 
further enhance protection of sensitive data. In addition, most of the product lines can be 
run in autonomous or lightweight mode. Autonomous mode is like any traditional WAP; 
lightweight mode requires the use of one of Cisco’s Wireless LAN controllers.60  
                                                 
58 Cisco Systems web site provides additional information about the Unified Wireless Network, 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns348/ns337/networking_solutions_package.html, Last 
accessed August 29, 2006. 
59 From Cisco web site, http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2006/prod_081406.html, Last accessed 
August 28, 2006. See also FIPS 140-2 Vendor List, http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401vend.htm for 
list of specific models. 
60 See Cisco’s web site for a discussion of Lightweight WAPs and a comparison with autonomous 
WAPs. http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6306/products_qanda_item09186a00806a4da3.shtml, Last 
accessed August 29, 2006. 
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c. WLAN Client Products 
This group of products is used in concert with the WAPs in the previous 
section to provide security of the communications link between wireless clients and 
WAPs. This category includes embedded wireless access devices within laptops or 
PDAs, expansion cards (internal PC cards, laptop cards, Compact Flash, and external 
USB devices), and client software. There are currently over 1,485 WLAN client products 
certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance that provide at least some form of encryption.61 Due to 
known weaknesses in the WEP protocol, however, one should only consider devices that 
support 802.11i security features such as WPA or WPA-2. Of note, 3eTI and Fortress 
Technologies offer products that are FIPS 140-2 validated. 
3e Technologies International (3eTI) 
3eTI’s entries in this category include cryptographic client software, a 
serial to Wi-Fi unit for sensor networks, and the AirGuard 110 WLAN PC Card (see 
Figure 18). When used in conjunction with 3eTI’s Crypto Client software, the 3e-110 
provides advanced wireless RF data security with AES and 3DES encryption that meets 
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements.62 It uses only 802.11b, however, which limits it to a 
maximum of 11 Mbps data transfer rate. 
 
Figure 18.   3eTI’s Client Hardware and Software 
                                                 
61 Wi-Fi Alliance, http://certifications.wi-fi.org/wbcs_certified_products.php, Last accessed August 
26, 2006. 
62 Also requires 3e’s Security Server software (3e-030) running on an application server within the 
wired portion of the network. See 3eTI’s Product Brochure for Security Server, 
http://en1.endiva.net/3eti/files/literature/3467.2447_3e-030_SecServ.pdf, Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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Fortress Technologies 
Fortress Technologies offers a software based product, the Fortress Secure 
Client (see Figure 19), that is FIPS 140-2 validated (up to Level 3 depending on operating 
system). Fortress’ web site states 
Fortress Secure Clients are security agents that provide the same level of 
high assurance security across all client devices. All critical security 
functions - encryption, authentication, data integrity checking, key 
exchange, and data compression - are optimized to ensure transparent 
operation. [It] enables devices to securely communicate with the network 
and peer-to-peer. When installed, the Fortress Secure Client creates a 
unique device identifier so that only authorized devices are allowed access 
to the network. This lightweight software agent supports the widest range 
of devices and operating systems. The Fortress Secure Client runs on PCs, 
tablets, PDAs, and industrial devices running Windows, Windows CE, 
Windows Mobile, Linux, Palm (Tungsten C), DOS, or Mac OS X (Tiger 
and Panther).63 
 
Figure 19.   Fortress Technologies Secure Client (From www.fortresstech.com) 
 
This software agent protects the authentication and connection of users 
and devices with AES, DES (Data Encryption Standard), or 3DES encryption, preventing 
unauthorized access while protecting login credentials and sensitive data across the 
wireless link. It also has a bridge version that allows for secure extension of applications, 
devices, and data throughout the enterprise. 
                                                 
63 See Fortress Technologies, 
http://www.fortresstech.com/products_services/products_secure_client.asp, Last accessed August 29, 2006.  
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E. PRODUCTS FOR MONITORING FOR SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE 
(STEP THREE) 
This category of products is the final layer of protection and security that one 
might apply to HFNs. It includes products such as Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems 
(WIDS) and Wireless Intrusion Prevention Systems (WIPS), as well as wireless 
management and control products. Some of these products could greatly simplify 
network management and control in the HFN. If the threat or the value of the data to be 
protected is high enough, these products would be essential in an HFN deployment.  
1. WIDS & WIPS 
A WIDS is typically composed of a central computer and various sensors that 
continuously scan for network anomalies, misconfiguration, and attack signatures to warn 
network administrators an attack is under way. A WIPS is similar in operation to a WIDS 
with the added function of having the ability to also take action to prevent an identified 
attacker from making unauthorized connection to victim systems.64 
a. AirDefense Enterprise 
AirDefense provides an enterprise class WIPS (see Figure 20) that was the 
first solution to receive Common Criteria certification and is widely used by U.S. 
government agencies.65 AirDefense’s product brochure states,  
As a key layer of security, AirDefense Enterprise 7.0 complements 
wireless VPNs, encryption & authentication. AirDefense Enterprise 
detects & responds to wireless threats and unauthorized devices on the 
wireless network using distributed smart sensors (monitoring 802.11 
a/b/g) and a secure server appliance. With Common Criteria certification 
and FIPS compliant cryptography, AirDefense’s enterprise-class products 
scale to support single offices as well as organizations with hundreds of 
locations around the globe… AirDefense uses collaborative intelligence 




                                                 
64 Moerschel et al (2006), p. 600. 
65 Common Criteria certification information pertains to the AirDefense Guard version 3.5 and is 
available at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/epfiles/ST_VID1025-VR.pdf.  A press 
release from AirDefense at http://www.airdefense.net/newsandpress/08_23_05.php states “AirDefense 
Enterprise is used by many government agencies…  and many other civilian agencies, to protect network 
data, detect unauthorized devices, mitigate threats and to monitor all wireless activity. [and] as a key 
component in WLAN architectures which have received DoD DITSCAP accreditation.” DITSCAP is the 
DoD Information Technology Security Certification & Accreditation Process. For additional information 
about DITSCAP, see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/520040.htm.  
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server appliance to monitor all 802.11 (a/b/g) wireless traffic in real time 




Figure 20.   AirDefense Enterprise Deployment (From www.airdefense.net) 
 
b. AirMagnet Enterprise 
AirMagnet’s product line includes tools for WLAN planning, 
management, and troubleshooting. These products combine to provide security, improve 
performance, and ensure compliance with industry-specific regulations. According to 
AirMagnet’s web site, with these solutions  
you always know who has access to your network, what the state of 
security is, how devices are performing, and more. Most importantly, if 
something goes wrong you have an expert system that automatically alerts 
you, identifies and explains each event, and physically locates issues, 
helping you to immediately solve problems anywhere in the network.67 
AirMagnet Enterprise 7.5 is more than just a WIPS; it provides 
management and policy enforcement functions as well. Figure 21 shows the AirMagnet 
Enterprise architecture which uses their FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated SmartEdge 
                                                 
66 AirDefense Enterprise product brochure is available for download from www.airdefense.net after 
completing a brief information request form. 
67 AirMagnet, https://airmagnet.com/products/, Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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Sensors. According to a September 2005 press release, “as the only vendor-independent 
wireless security solution to achieve FIPS 140-2 certification, AirMagnet Enterprise is 
the leading choice for government agencies and other organizations and enterprises 
tasked with guaranteeing the integrity of highly sensitive data.”68 
  
 




                                                 
68 AirMagnet, http://www.airmagnet.com/news/press/news.20050926.htm, Last accessed August 30, 
2006. 
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2. Wireless Management & Control Products 
This category of products includes those that specialize in controlling and 
managing other wireless devices. Major functions include WLAN security policy 
enforcement and compliance checking as well as control of access points and end user 
device configuration monitoring. 
a. Aruba Mobility Controllers and Management System 
Aruba uses their mobility controllers to control their line of wireless APs 
and to provide encryption, authentication, and other security and management functions. 
Aruba’s Mobile Edge product brochure claims, 
Mobility controllers are high-performance networking platforms built 
specifically to run centralized ArubaOS functions such as controlled 
access point management, 802.11 station management, 802.11x [sic] 
authentication and encryption, site-to-site and client VPNs using 
IPsec/3DES encryption, stateful policy enforcement firewalls, L1-L7 
intrusion protection, endpoint integrity checking, and seamless user 
roaming between access points and across mobility controllers.69 
They offer three different models including the Aruba 800, 2400, and 
6000 which offer varying levels of scalability and functionality. The Aruba 800 and 6000 
are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated when running the ArubaOS version 2.4.1.0-FIPS 
Software.70 
Aruba’s other offering in this category is their Mobility Management 
System (MMS) which is available as an integrated appliance and as a software 
application. In conjunction with its Mobility Controllers and Controlled Access Points, 
the MMS provides a comprehensive suite of applications for planning, monitoring, fault 
management, reporting, RF coverage and location visualization.71 Figure 22 shows the 
Aruba MMS architecture. 
                                                 
69 Aruba Networks, http://www.arubanetworks.com/pdf/me_prodbrochure.pdf, Last accessed August 
30, 2006. 
70 See FIPS 140-2 Vendor List, http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401val2006.htm#649 for details. 
Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
71 Aruba Networks Mobility Management System Product Brochure is available at 
http://www.arubanetworks.com/pdf/mms.pdf, Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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Figure 22.   Aruba Networks MMS Architecture (From Ref 59). 
 
b. BlueSocket BlueSecure Controllers 
BlueSocket provides a family of WLAN controllers that provide flexible 
role-based access control and policy enforcement; universal WLAN authentication; 
strong data encryption; intrusion detection, worm protection and clientless scanning for 
trusted endpoint security; and security and Quality of Service for VoIP.72 The BSC 2100 
and 5000 controllers are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated.73 
 
                                                 
72 BlueSocket web site, http://www.bluesocket.com/products/controllerfamily.html, Last accessed 
August 30, 2006. 
73 See FIPS 140-2 alphabetical list of vendors at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401vend.htm, 
Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
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c. Cisco Systems  
Cisco Systems provides several products that fit into the management and 
control category. First, Cisco’s Network Admission Control (NAC), which is part of 
Cisco’s Self-Defending Network, helps ensure that all wired and wireless endpoint 
devices (such as PCs, laptops, servers, and PDAs) accessing network resources are 
adequately protected from security threats.74 Cisco offers NAC as an appliance and a 
framework. The appliance provides an end-to-end solution that allows network 
administrators to authenticate, authorize, evaluate, and remediate wired and wireless 
users and their machines prior to allowing access to the network. The NAC framework 
solution is an architecture-based approach that uses the network infrastructure and third-
party software to enforce security policy compliance on all endpoints. 
Second, Cisco’s Wireless LAN Controllers come in stand-alone and 
modular form. They provide security, mobility, and ease of use to manage from 6 (2000 
series and WLAN Controller Module) to 100 (4400 Series) Lightweight Wireless Access 
Points (LWAP).75 They each provide centralized security policy management, WIPS 
capabilities, RF management, Quality of Service, and OSI Layer 3 fast secure roaming 
for WLANs. 
d. Fortress Management and Policy Server (MaPS) 
Fortress’ MaPS runs as a server on Windows 2000 (Service Pack 4) or 
Windows Server 2003 and provides centralized management for their Security Gateways 
and Controllers. Their product brochure lists the following features and benefits:76 
• Policy Based Management 
• Identity Based Access Control 
• Centralized monitoring 
• User & Device Authentication 
• Enterprise Scalability 
                                                 
74 See Cisco web site, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns466/networking_solutions_package.html 
for full details on NAC. Last accessed September 2, 2006. 
75 See Cisco web site, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6366/index.html for information on the 
4400 series; http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6308/index.html for information on the 2000 series 
and http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6730/index.html for information on the WLAN controller 
module for Integrated Services Routers. Last accessed September 2, 2006. 
76 See Fortress Technologies, http://www.fortresstech.com/products_services/pdfs/maps.pdf for 
additional details. Last accessed September 2, 2006. 
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e. Newbury Networks WiFi Watchdog 
Newbury Networks WiFi Watchdog™ detects, monitors and secures 
802.11-based WLANs. Key features include physical perimeter security and 
containment; rogue AP and WLAN detection; actionable alerts; client protection and 
unapproved connection prevention; intrusion detection with precise location; and 
seamless integration with existing infrastructure (e.g., Cisco, Aruba, Symbol, Trapeze).77 
Using patented location tracking and location based authentication, WiFi Watchdog is 
able to provide security and authentication for any authorized device joining the network 
while denying access to unauthorized devices. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a snap shot of some of the COTS wireless security 
products available on the market as of this writing and is far from exhaustive. In fact, new 
products are coming on the market almost daily. The reader needs only do a Google 
search on wireless security to get hundreds of “hits”. 
The next chapter provides a simple implementation of some of the security 
practices described in Chapter III (primarily securing the communication path) using 
some of the products from this chapter. It then concludes with a target architecture for an 
HFN deployment that uses all three aspects of the AirDefense (2006) three-step method. 
 
 
                                                 
77 Newbury Networks, http://www.newburynetworks.com/products-watchdog.htm, Last accessed 
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V. A SECURE WIRELESS ARCHITECTURE FOR HFNS 
As previously discussed, there are seemingly conflicting requirements for an 
HFN.  The primary concern is rapidly installing a communications network with at least 
voice and data services that will support the maximum number of users.  This implies a 
requirement for openness which seems to contradict the need for security as discussed in 
Chapter II.  Additionally, an HFN must be easy to install, operate, and maintain with a 
limited number of onsite personnel. This, too, may seem to fly in the face of security. 
One possible solution is to treat the HFN like an enterprise WLAN requiring 
guest access.  While there are some aspects of an enterprise WLAN that are unique (e.g., 
fixed location, RF over-radiation concerns), it nevertheless serves as a good model for 
applying wireless security measures to an HFN. The key in an HFN is ensuring that guest 
access is available to maximize user access, but does not allow guest users to access data 
or services requiring protection. This ensures that users who provide their own devices 
(e.g., laptops) are able to join the network, but are properly segmented from other areas 
of the network requiring protection. One method for ensuring this segmentation is the use 
of multiple SSIDs and VLANs. 
The following sections provide one example of such an implementation.  This is 
an actual implementation that allows for a limited number of users. It incorporates 
portions of the three step method introduced in Chapter III (primarily step two) and uses 
some of the COTS equipment detailed in Chapter IV to provide a security solution while 
still meeting the requirement for openness to allow as many users as possible to join the 
network. This is the actual architecture currently implemented in the NPS Nemesis MRF. 
This implementation does not, however, provide for the management component 
discussed as step three in the AirDefense model shown in Chapter III, but could easily 
scale to include that capability at a later time.  
Finally, this chapter concludes with a target architecture modeled using the Cisco 
Unified Wireless Network approach. This is a much more robust design for a medium to 
large scale implementation and would include protection of end points, communication 
paths, and appropriate monitoring and control. 
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A. WIRELESS WARFARE LAB & NEMESIS IMPLEMENTATION 
Following the AirDefense three-step method introduced in Chapter III, the author 
designed a small prototype network to meet a set of requirements addressing an HA/DR 
scenario similar to those introduced in Chapter I. The scope of the implementation is 
limited to the 802.11 wireless paths in a single node. Due to limited equipment 
availability, this implementation focuses primarily on the second step or securing the 
communications channels. Additional hardware and software necessary to fully 
implement steps one and three are discussed later in the target architecture. 
Specifically, this implementation meets the following requirements: 
• Secure wireless access to a “protected” set of clients and servers 
• Secure wireless access for VoIP phones 
• Non-secure guest wireless access with no access to “protected” assets 
 
The solution was implemented using the following equipment: 
• Cisco 2811 router with internal HWIC 4ESW & HWIC AP cards running 
Internetwork Operating System (IOS) version 12.4(2)T78 
• Cisco 2950 switch running IOS version 12.1(22)EA4 standard image 
• Fujitsu P-Series Lifebook laptop running Windows XP Home 
• Panasonic CF-48 laptop running Windows 2000 
• HP Pavilion DV1000 series laptop running Windows XP Professional 
• Cisco AIR-CB21AG-A-K9 PCM/CIA wireless card 
• Cisco 7920 Wireless VoIP handset 
 
Figure 23 shows the architecture of this implementation.  
                                                 
78 HWIC-4ESW is Cisco’s High-Speed WAN Interface Card 4-port Ethernet Switch and HWIC-AP is 




Figure 23.   Wireless Warfare Lab Implementation 
 
This solution included programming the Cisco 2811 internal access point with 
three SSIDs: data, guest, and voip. The data SSID was protected with WPA-PSK (pre-
shared key); the guest SSID had no encryption applied; the voip SSID will have WEP 
applied in a future implementation. Each of these SSIDs were mapped to a separate 
VLAN programmed within the router: 1 = data (protected data); 2 = guest (no 
protection); 3 = voip (will have WEP on wireless segment).  
The Catalyst 2950-24 switch was programmed with ports 1-16 mapped to VLAN 
1; ports 17-20 mapped to VLAN 3; and ports 21-24 as trunk ports for communication 
with the router and other switches. For this implementation, none of the switch’s Ethernet 
ports were programmed for guest VLAN access. Guest access was restricted to only 
wireless clients. 
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Next, the router had to be programmed with several access control lists to manage 
how and where the traffic flowed from the internal access point to the wired ports within 
the router and on the switch. 
This implementation allowed for properly configured wireless clients to join the 
protected data SSID and gain access to the wired workstations. The same approach was 
used to verify the access for the voip SSID and VLAN programming. Due to a lack of 
availability of the Call Manager Express for the VoIP phones, wireless laptops and a 
wired workstation were used to verify this step. Finally, wireless clients without the 
proper security configuration were only able to join the guest SSID which was the only 
SSID being broadcast from the WAP. The author verified this configuration does prevent 
traffic from the unprotected guest SSID/VLAN from being able to access either of the 
other VLANs. 
A similar configuration was then implemented in the NPS Nemesis MRF to 
facilitate network segmentation and protection of data while providing for wireless guest 
access. Figure 24 shows the Nemesis implementation. A Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch with 
power over Ethernet was added to the equipment string to facilitate power to the VoIP 
phones. This configuration was successfully used to support Exercise Strong Angel III in 
San Diego, CA from 20-26 August 2006.79  
 
                                                 
79 Strong Angel III is a disaster-response exercise that simulates a worldwide viral pandemic that 
stretches emergency response efforts toward the breaking point. At the same time, a terrorist network 
launches a wave of cyber-attacks that disable communications throughout the United States when they’re 
needed most. The Nemesis MRF was used to facilitate emergency communications during the exercise. See 
Strong Angel III web site, http://www.strongangel3.net/, for additional information. Last accessed 




Figure 24.   Nemesis VLAN Implementation 
 
These two implementations were quite simplistic and met a limited goal. The next 
section provides a target architecture for future HFN deployments. It includes suggested 
additions to the Nemesis MRF and a starting point for the design of Fly Away Kits 
(FLAK). 
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B. TARGET HFN ARCHITECTURE 
For this target architecture, the author recommends treating the HFN like an 
enterprise wireless network that has appropriate security measures applied and provides 
for guest wireless access. Using the Cisco Unified Wireless Network model, with its 
various security mechanisms, a properly equipped and configured HFN could provide all 
the desired security attributes introduced in earlier chapters.80 Figure 25 shows the 
layered approach used in this model.  
 
Figure 25.   Cisco Unified Wireless Networks (From www.cisco.com)81 
 
                                                 
80 See also Cisco’s White Paper Titled Best Practices For Outdoor Wireless Security. 
http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/netsol/ns621/c654/cdccont_0900aecd8044059b.pdf, Last 
accessed September 2, 2006. 
81 See Cisco Systems web site 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns348/ns337/networking_solutions_package.html, Last 
accessed September 2, 2006. 
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This implementation fits well for the HFN because of its scalability and 
centralized management capabilities. Continuing the work this author did with the 
Nemesis MRF, the next step would involve adding a wireless LAN controller to the 
Cisco 2811 Integrated Services Router (ISR) (shown earlier in Figure 24). Then, the 
Nemesis MRF would be able to control up to six LWAPs and would have the ability to 
deliver centralized security policies, WIPS capabilities, RF management, quality of 
service, and OSI Layer 3 fast secure roaming for its WLANs. 
The next equipment to add to Nemesis would be the six LWAPs (e.g., Cisco 
Aironet 1500 series mesh LWAPs), a Cisco Wireless Location Appliance, and the Cisco 
Wireless Control System (WCS). The Wireless Location Appliance uses advanced RF 
fingerprinting technology to simultaneously track thousands of 802.11 wireless devices 
from directly within the WLAN infrastructure. This allows not only asset tracking, but 
also provides location-based alerts for policy enforcement and RF capacity 
management.82 Only one of these devices is necessary for any HFN and could, in fact, be 
deployed forward or kept in the rear at the network operations center (NOC). 
According to Cisco’s web site, the WCS is the leading platform for wireless LAN 
planning, configuration, and management.83 The WCS is an optional component that 
works in conjunction with LWAPs, WLAN controllers, and the Wireless Location 
Appliance. With the WCS, administrators have a single solution for RF prediction, policy 
provisioning, network optimization, troubleshooting, user tracking, security monitoring, 
and WLAN systems management. Cisco WCS runs on a server platform with an 
embedded database. This provides the scalability necessary to manage hundreds of Cisco 
wireless LAN controllers, which in turn can manage thousands of Cisco Aironet LWAPs. 
This allows for the WCS to also be located outside the affected area where the HFN is 
deployed. Cisco wireless LAN controllers can be located on the same LAN as Cisco 
WCS, on separate routed subnets, or across a wide-area connection. All Cisco wireless 
LAN controller models can be managed by Cisco WCS.  
                                                 
82 See Cisco web site, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6386/prod_literature.html for details 
on the Wireless Location Appliance. Last accessed September 2, 2006. 
83 See Cisco web site, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6305/index.html for information about 
the Wireless Control System. Last accessed September 2, 2006. 
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Similar configurations could be built into FLAKs. One FLAK should be designed 
as the network hub or NOC kit. The others should be designed to provide one node with 
up to six LWAPs and one ISR with Wireless LAN Control Module (WLCM). Figures 26 
and 27 show notional equipment stacks for the NOC and node FLAKs. Both notional kits 
show only the 802.11 wireless and control equipment. One would also need the 




Figure 26.   Notional FLAK for Network Operations Center 
 
This NOC kit contains the necessary gear to operate and manage all wireless 
equipment in the HFN. In addition, it would include local user equipment (e.g., VoIP 





Figure 27.   Notional FLAK for HFN Node 
 
The Node Kit would include only a properly equipped ISR and the wireless 
equipment necessary for establishing the 802.11 cloud. In addition, it should contain at 
least a couple of VoIP phones and laptops for end users.  
This target architecture and notional FLAKs are intended to provide a starting 


























A. KEY FINDINGS 
1. HFNs Have Seemingly Conflicting Requirements 
Openness vs. Security! HFNs must be rapidly deployable and must serve the 
maximum number of users with a minimum amount of labor for installation, operation, 
and maintenance.  Conversely, they do contain information that needs protecting and, 
therefore, must have at least some level of security implemented. This implementation 
must be simple and easy to manage either remotely (by experts not in the affected area) 
or on scene by personnel who are properly trained. 
2. HFNs Can Be Treated Like Enterprise WLANs 
There are numerous ways to apply security mechanisms to HFNs. Chapter III 
showed two models for layering security onto wireless networks. Treating an HFN like 
an enterprise wireless network allows one to use recognized best practices for applying 
either of those models. To meet the requirement for openness, one can implement a guest 
access SSID and VLAN to allow open access while segmenting the “untrusted” users 
from the data you wish to protect. 
3. No Single Security Product or Process Can Ensure Total Protection 
As the authors of Motorola (2006) point out, wireless security is a combination of 
people, process, policy, and technology.  This thesis focused primarily on the technology 
aspect of security. There are thousands of existing COTS products that claim to provide 
wireless network security. As many security experts have previously stated, the best way 
to implement security is through the concept of Defense in Depth. Therefore, choosing 
one or more security mechanism from the various categories discussed will improve the 
overall security on your wireless network. 
4. Implementing a WLAN Security Solution for HFNs is a Must 
The last thing an HFN should do is complicate the situation it is trying to help. 
Implementing an HFN without security would almost certainly do just that. This thesis 
provided an example of an implementation of hardware and software that will provide a 
measure of wireless security for a future deployment of HFNs. Further work and funding 
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are required, but implementing a rapidly deployable, easily configurable HFN with 
robust, multi-layer security is definitely achievable. 
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An HFN, like an enterprise WLAN, should have at least some measure of security 
implemented. The amount of security provided will be situation dependent; however, not 
implementing any security could further harm those you are trying to help. At a 
minimum, any HFN deployed should consider the following to ensure the maximum 
protection for “private” information within the HFN: 
• having protection at the edges by controlling at least some of the end-user 
devices 
• protecting the communications paths by using commercially available 
encryption mechanisms like WPA, WPA2, or VPNs 
• authenticating users or devices via RADIUS or some other authentication 
mechanism 
• monitoring the security and compliance on the network 
Providing a guest access SSID is also paramount in situations like the HA/DR 
scenarios introduced earlier to ensure the maximum number of affected personnel, rescue 
workers, first responders, volunteers, local government agency personnel, and others 
have immediate access to voice and data services on the WLAN. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Fly Away Kits (FLAKs) 
Build and test FLAKs that have the aforementioned security mechanisms 
implemented. Include wireless mesh technology to allow for rapid expansion of coverage 
area. 
2. Nemesis MRF 
Complete the configuration of the Nemesis Mobile Research Facility (MRF) and 
expand the security mechanisms to include mutual authentication and centralized 
management. Add Lightweight Wireless Access Points and WLAN controllers to 





3. Develop HFN Documentation 
A detailed CONOPS, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) documents, and a 
WLAN security policy for future HFN deployments would go a long way toward 
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APPENDIX A SAMPLE WLAN SECURITY POLICY TEMPLATE 
This Wireless LAN Security Policy Template © Copyright 2003 Planet3 
Wireless, Inc. is included by permission from Devin Akin, Chief Technical Officer.84 
 
The template below is included in its entirety, but has been reformatted for 
inclusion as an appendix in this thesis. 
 
ABOUT THIS TEMPLATE: 
Joel Barrett, a Systems Engineer and member of the Enterprise Wireless LAN 
Technology Leadership Program (TLP) at Cisco Systems, developed this Wireless LAN 
Security Policy Template. 
The purpose of this template is to provide enterprises with a starting point for 
developing a security policy to apply to the implementation of a wireless network, 
whether that implementation is yet to be completed, or has been installed already. The 
point being that any organization that uses wireless LAN technology needs to have a 
security policy to address the security issues inherent to any wireless LAN installation. 
This template is fully printable, can be used on a PDA, allows extraction of 
contents, but does not allow for editing of the document. 
                                                 
84 D. Akin, personal communication, August 6, 2006. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Use the following template to build a comprehensive corporate wireless LAN 
security policy. Each section and subsection contains a heading and then brief 
instructions or suggestions for what that section should contain. The final result should be 
integrated with the existing corporate security policy. Organizations may not need all of 
the sections listed in this template, but we have included a comprehensive list to choose 
from. The policy may need revision when new wireless network vulnerabilities and/or 
solutions arrive in the market place. An electronic version (Adobe PDF) of this template 
is available when you subscribe to the CWNP e-mail newsletter. 
GENERAL POLICY 
This first section, General Policy, is used as an introduction to why the 
organization is adding a wireless section to their corporate security policy (its purpose) 
and what role this policy will play in keeping the network safe from intrusion. Even if the 
organization has no wireless capabilities, a wireless security policy should be in place to 
address a minimum of rogue equipment discovery. 
Introduction 
An introductory section on what the General Policy section covers and how it 
applies to the organization. 
Statement of Authority 
Define the authority that put this policy in place. 
Executive Sponsorship 
List the executive sponsors who back this policy and their contact information. 
Emergency Response Team 
Large organizations usually have an Emergency Response Team to handle 
corporate security issues for both facility and network emergencies. List ERT network 
representatives and the team’s contact information. 
Applicable audience 
Define the audience to whom this policy applies, including employees, visitors, 
and contractors. 
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Scaled down versions of the Wireless LAN Security Policy may be needed for IT 
staff, end users, visitors, and contractors as an easy-to-read type of “To Do” and “Not To 
Do” list. 
Violation reporting procedures and enforcement 
Part of the security policy must address policy enforcement. When policy is 
violated, there must be a procedure in place to address what actions the organization will 
take against the individual that violates policy directives. Define and describe what will 
be done to reinforce policy directives after a violation and what reports will be written by 






List and discuss the organization’s intellectual property, trade secrets, identity 
information, credit card information, health information, customer databases, and any 
other information stores that could be jeopardized by wireless network compromise. 
Network Services 
List and describe email, file, database, directory, custom application services, 
Internet connectivity, web-based applications, and virus and intrusion detection services 
that could be compromised by network infiltration. 
Threat Prevention 
Explain the steps necessary to reduce or prevent wireless network threats, such as: 
• Denial of Service (DoS) 
• Equipment Damage or Theft 
• Unauthorized Network Access 
• Credit Card Fraud 
• Identity Theft 
• Corporate Secret Theft 
• Personal Information Exposure 
• Malicious Data Insertion 
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Legal Liabilities 
Document legal liabilities that could be incurred in the event of a wireless 
network compromise and how to react to each type of situation appropriately. These 
liabilities should also include third party attacks and illegal data insertion. 
Note that if exposure to legal liabilities presents a problem that could cost 
significant amounts of time and money due to an intrusion, then adequate resources 
should be proactively applied to the security weaknesses. 
Costs 
Management must consider costs involving people, training, and equipment when 
implementing wireless LAN security solutions. Keeping quality employees who fully 
understand the network and its vulnerabilities is especially important. Training is 
continually required for installation and configuration tasks. Training is imperative to 
maintaining network operations, end-user capabilities, and security solution upgrades. 
This section should give way to Finance & Budget documentation for extensive 
details, but should outline the importance of appropriate spending to assure security 
levels are appropriate. List the various expenses that are expected in implementing and 
maintaining proper wireless network security. 
Impact Analysis 
An Impact Analysis should be performed so that administrators understand the 
degree of potential loss involved in a network compromise. The following items, as a 
minimum, must be considered during the Impact Analysis: 
• Financial Loss 
• Data Loss 
• Loss of Customer Confidence 
• Reputation Damage 
• Regulatory Effects 
Policy should address accessing the network from outside the organization, 






This section is about hiring external consultants to perform independent security 
testing of wireless network systems. This step is often taken after internal resources and 
knowledge have been exhausted or to get a fresh perspective on security design and 
solution selection. The tests allowed to be performed by the consultant should be 
documented and cleared through internal legal channels. Any anticipated vulnerabilities 
or limitations of the security solutions chosen should be documented before the auditor 
begins any testing. 
Sources of Information 
There are many tools hackers can employ to infiltrate wireless networks. Audits 
should employ as many of these tools as possible: 
• Wireless LAN Discovery 
• Password Capture & Decrypt 
• Share Enumerators 
• Network Management & Control 
• Wireless Protocol Analyzers 
• Manufacturer Defaults 
• Antennas & WLAN Equipment 
• OS Fingerprinting & Port Scanning 
• Application Layer Analyzers 
• Networking Utilities 
• Network Discovery Tools 
• RF Jamming Tools 
• Hijacking Tools 
• WEP Decryption Tools 
• Operating System Exploit Tools 
List and describe the tools that are, have been, or will be used in auditing the 
wireless segment of the network. 
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Policy Change Control and Review 
Contacts and Responsibilities 
Include the specific contacts and their responsibilities for policy change control 
management. 
Change Management Procedures 
List the specific procedures for making changes to organizational policy. 
Change Control Enforcement 
Describe the procedures when enforcing organizational policy change control. 
Password Policy 
Guidelines 
Create guidelines that help users implement strong passwords and help 
administrators enforce password policy. 
Password Implementation 
If passwords are used as a security mechanism, set password policies for the 
following network devices as a minimum. 
• Access points 
• Wireless client software 
• Other wireless infrastructure devices 
• Windows platforms 
• Linux/Unix platforms 
• VPN solutions 
• Applications 
Networking Staff and End User Employee Training Requirements 
Networking Staff 
Explain training requirements for the networking staff. 
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End Users 
Explain training requirements for end users. 
Non-Employee Wireless Access 
Visitors 
Explain access restrictions for visitors. 
Consultants 
Explain access restrictions for consultants. 
Acceptable Use Policy 
Acceptable Use 
Explain acceptable uses of the wireless network. 
Unacceptable Use 
Explain unacceptable uses of the wireless network. 
Violation Enforcement 
Define the methods used to enforce the Acceptable Use Policy. 
Staging, Implementation, and Management Procedures 
Describe the procedures that will be used to maintain consistency when staging, 
implementing, and managing wireless network devices. These procedures must be readily 
available and up-to-date when used by support staff to manage the devices. This section 
may include checklists, interface types used for management, and how the wireless 
infrastructure will be installed. 
Auditing and Compliance 
Internal recurring process by support staff 
Support staff must perform penetration testing and reporting, vulnerability 
scanning, and risk assessments on an ongoing basis. Audits should follow the policies 
established in the Risk Assessment section of the Wireless LAN Security Policy. Define 
established timelines and processes for recurring internal audits. 
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External periodic process by independent professionals 
Independent professionals should be considered as a valid periodic method of 
performing penetration testing and reporting, vulnerability scanning, and risk 




Create a security checklist that addresses the expectations of the security policy. 
This checklist will be used during product staging, implementation, and management to 
verify configuration parameters are set correctly. This checklist should comply with the 
Baseline Practices section below. 
Available Network Resources 
Define the restrictions that wireless users have compared to wired network users 
regarding use of existing network resources. It is not always necessary to give wireless 
users the same level of access to network resources as wired users. 
Asset Management 
Describe the asset management practices in place and how they affect the wireless 
network. This may include an intrusion detection and management software package or 
similar asset management tool. 
Periodic Inventory 
Show the organization’s inventory schedule and the team responsible for the 
schedule. 
Change Management 
Make appropriate annotations about how existing change management procedures 
should include wireless LAN infrastructure devices. This should list the steps to be 
followed in order to properly implement a change on the wireless network so as to assure 
adherence with all sections of this policy. 
Spot-checks & Accountability 
Perform regular spot checks to prevent rogue access points and similar devices 
and to verify policy compliance. End users and network staff should be held accountable 
to the corporate policy. Establish timelines and processes for conducting spot checks. 
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Baseline Practices 
Establish baseline practices to help create operating procedures and 
implementation checklists for wireless LAN equipment and security. These areas need to 
be considered: 
• Access point default SSID modification 
• MAC filtering 
• Use of static WEP 
• Default access point configuration modification 
• Firmware upgrades for wireless network equipment 
• Rogue equipment 
• Outdoor bridge security 
• RF cell sizing and AP placement 
• SNMP configuration 
• Discovery protocol configuration 
• Remote access configuration 
• Client configuration 
• IP services configuration 
• AP network connectivity 
• Pre-deployment staging and testing 
• Equipment installation 
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FUNCTIONAL POLICY –  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Interoperability 
Consider solutions that interoperate and document how interoperability affects 
purchasing decisions. For example, if 128-bit WEP is chosen as a security solution and 
multiple wireless LAN infrastructure equipment providers are used, then interoperability 
testing should be performed before an enterprise rollout is attempted and before a large 
amount of equipment is purchased. 
Layering 
If solutions that use different layers of the OSI model are used, it is important to 
document which solution types will be used and to assure that they have been tested 
together. An example of this is using 802.1x/EAP (Layer 2) solutions with IPSec (Layer 
3). Define policy for implementing layered security solutions. 
Segmentation & VLANs 
Wireless LANs should be segmented from the wired network backbone by an 
appropriate security solution. Wired and wireless VLANs offer a method of segmenting 
users and networks. The importance of segmentation should be explained here, and the 
type(s) of segmentation solution required to properly secure the network should be listed. 
Any necessary security and mobility features should be documented here. 
Authentication & Encryption 
Choose and document authentication and encryption types based on existing 
implementations, data sensitivity, scalability, availability, and access control. 
Existing Implementations 
Authentication system integration with existing user databases and authentication 
systems and support for the latest standards, security features, and protocols is 
paramount. Existing equipment may not be able to support the latest available encryption, 
so an evaluation of the level of security provided by these more legacy devices is 
warranted. Describe and document the current level of encryption on existing systems 
and devices. 
Data Sensitivity 
Define and document authentication and encryption solutions that support the 
required level of security. Keep in mind that authentication systems do not typically 
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provide data payload encryption. In most cases, authentication and data encryption must 
be handled by separate mechanisms. 
Scalability & Availability 
Security solutions should be scalable and provide a high degree of availability for 
users. Wireless networks allow employees to be mobile which means that new ways of 
using the network will be found. This will translate into increased network usage and 
dependency on the network. The network’s design should lend itself to ease of growth at 
a reasonable cost. Define and describe the levels of scalability and availability that are 
required for the wireless network to grow with the organization. 
Access Control 
Having a wide range of devices types may dictate a degree of flexibility in 
choosing security solutions. Create corporate security solutions that can handle access 
control for a variety of wireless network device types, manufacturers, and operating 
systems. Solutions may include client and server software applications that run on 
various operating systems, authentication and encryption appliances, and a plethora of 
infrastructure devices such as access points, workgroup bridges, and wireless bridges. 
Access may be controlled based on roles, groups, device types, etc. Define and document 
the different levels of access control to be implemented on the wireless network segment. 
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FUNCTIONAL POLICY –  MONITORING AND RESPONSE 
 
Physical Security 
Address unauthorized visitors in the facility’s physical security policy. Physical 
access and security of wireless infrastructure devices is extremely important in 
preventing hackers from entering the facility to place their own wireless devices onto the 
network and to keep thieves from stealing equipment or accessing console ports of 
infrastructure devices. Define and describe the facility’s physical security required as a 
result of implementing the wireless network.  
Rogue Access Points & Ad Hoc Networks 
Prevent rogue access points and Ad Hoc networks inside the corporate work area. 
A well-defined wireless security policy can help prevent most rogue access points –  
whether placed by employees or intruders. Make periodic manual scans or have a 
wireless IDS in place to detect unauthorized equipment. Define and describe the 
regularity and processes for preventing and detecting rogue wireless devices. 
RF Jamming 
RF jamming should be addressed so that network administrators understand how 
to recognize and appropriately react to unintentional and intentional jamming of any kind 
–  to include spread spectrum and narrowband. Explain how RF jamming is accomplished 
and explain appropriate preventative or responsive steps. 
Data Flooding 
Give end users a clear definition of what it means to be a good wireless network 
user. End users may inadvertently flood the wireless network when downloading large 
files. Help end users understand what should and should not occur over the wireless 
LAN. Explain baselining as a task to be performed by the network administrator, and 
reinforce the importance of maintaining baselines over time and changes to the network. 
Explain how baselines are to be used as a comparative tool to help identify network 
attacks. Explain how data flooding is accomplished, and list any preventative steps. 
Social Engineering 
Ensure employees are aware of the data they are making available to others and 
what hackers might do with the knowledge they gain from that data. Train end users in 
the proper handling of social engineering tactics, such as: 
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• Dumpster diving 
• Phone calls 
• Email 
• Instant messaging 
• Onsite Visits 
 
Prevention 
Teach employees how to prevent intrusion attempts by verifying identification, 
using secure communication methods, reporting suspicious activity, establishing 
procedures, and shredding corporate documents. Define established procedures for 
employees to report or respond to various types of attacks. 
Audits 
Employ external consultants to perform periodic audits and social engineering 
attempts to test employees and the network security. Define regularity of audits by 
external consultants. 
Reporting 
Develop clear procedures for who is responsible for generating reports and who 
reviews the reports. Timely, accurate, and comprehensible reports are essential in future 
attack prevention and pinpointing hacker activity. Define and describe the types of 
reports, details within the reports, and proper archival of all reports for historical 
reference. 
Response Procedures 
Define the steps to take after an intrusion has been recognized. Recommended 
steps should include a minimum of the following: 
• Positive identification 
• Confirmed attack 




WLAN SECURITY POLICY APPENDICES (AS NEEDED) 
 
Glossary 
Include a glossary to define words readers may not understand or those that 
require further clarification. 
Whitepapers 
Include any applicable industry whitepapers that may help during implementation, 
analysis, prevention, or recovery. 
Education / Certification 
List any classes, self-study materials, and certifications that would be beneficial to 





APPENDIX B RESOURCES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following is a list of references and other resources the author found useful 
during the research phase of this thesis. It includes various publications and web sites that 
were not necessarily cited in the body of the thesis, but are very useful for further 
research in the area of wireless security. 
 
Department of Defense Directives, Instructions, and Guides:  
All available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 8100.2, (2004), Use of Commercial Wireless 
Devices, Services, and Technologies in the DoD Global Information Grid. 
Department of Defense Directive 8500.1, (2002), Information Assurance. 
Department of Defense Instruction 8500.2, (2003), Information Assurance 
Implementation.   
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guides 
(STIG) including those specifically targeted at wireless implementations. 
Available at http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/stig/. 
 
Other Federal Government Publications and Guides: 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-48, Wireless 
Network Security, 802.11, Bluetooth, and Handheld Devices. Available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html. 




IEEE 802.11 LAN/MAN Wireless LANS series. Available at  
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/portfolio.html.  
IEEE 802.1X IEEE Standards for LAN and MAN--Port-Based Network Access Control. 
Available at http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.1.html.  
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Wireless Security Vendor Web Sites 
Vendor Name Web Site 




Aruba Networks www.arubanetworks.com 
Blue Ridge Networks www.blueridgenetworks.com 
BlueSocket www.bluesocket.com 
CipherOptics www.cipheroptics.com  
Cisco Systems www.cisco.com 
Cranite Systems www.cranite.com 
EFJ, Inc: (new parent company of 3eTI) www.efji.com 
Fortress Technologies www.fortresstech.com 
Juniper Networks www.juniper.net 
Newbury Networks www.newburynetworks.com 
Phoenix Technologies www.phoenix.com 
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Other Wi-Fi Related Web Sites 
Common Criteria  Certified Products 
 http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/consumer/index.php 
FIPS 140-2 Validated Products 
 http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401vend.htm 
Info Security Products Guide (Wireless) 
 http://www.infosecurityproductsguide.com/products/wireless.html 
Network World Wireless Security 
 http://www.networkworld.com/topics/wireless-security.html  
Wi-Fi Alliance 
 http://www.wi-fi.org/ 
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